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Abstract
Voters are now demanding the ability to verify that their votes are cast and counted
as intended. Most existing cryptographic election protocols do not treat the voter
as a computationally-limited entity separate from the voting booth, and therefore
do not ensure that the voting booth records the correct vote. David Chaum and
Andrew Neﬀ have proposed mixnet schemes that do provide this assurance, but little
research has been done that combines voter veriﬁcation with homomorphic encryp-
tion. This thesis proposes adding voter veriﬁcation to an existing multi-candidate
election scheme (Baudron et al.) that uses Paillier encryption. A “cut and choose”
protocol provides a probabilistic guarantee of correctness. The scheme is straightfor-
ward, and could easily be extended to multi-authority elections. The feasibility of
the proposed scheme is demonstrated via a simple implementation.
Thesis Supervisor: Ronald L. Rivest
Title: Viterbi Professor of Computer Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Requirements for an election vary by country and election type, but there are certain
properties that are a starting point for all voting systems.
1. Democratic – each eligible voter must be able to vote and may vote at most
once.
2. Private – a voter’s ﬁnal ballot must be secret.
3. Uncoercible – a voter cannot prove the contents of her ﬁnal ballot to anyone.
4. Accurate – the ﬁnal tally is the sum of the cast votes.
5. Veriﬁable – an individual can prove to herself that her vote was cast as intended
and that it was counted, and anyone can prove that the ﬁnal tally is accurate.
6. Robust – a small group of people cannot disrupt the election.
7. Fair – Partial totals should not be known early.
It is also important for an election to be convenient and ﬂexible for the voters
and oﬃcials. Voters will be less likely to vote if the process is complicated and
diﬃcult to understand. Oﬃcials are unlikely to adopt a system that cannot support
voting practices particular to their districts, such as write-in votes and instant runoﬀ
elections.
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Paper-based voting systems have been the standard since the mid-19th century,
when secret votes became the norm. Electronic systems, often called Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) systems, have become more prominent recently. In a society that
is increasingly turning to technology to automate and streamline everyday tasks, it
is natural to apply technology to an institution as important as elections. Electronic
voting systems have the potential to improve accuracy and security of elections as
well as alleviate many of the logistical headaches.
One of the major advantages of DRE systems is the potential for consistent im-
plementation of security policies. A machine does only what it is programmed to
do, whereas human behavior is situation-dependent and may bias the election sys-
tem. Despite this potential, most DRE systems still rely exclusively on the integrity
of election oﬃcials and training of poll workers to ensure the election maintains the
proper security and privacy. In order to believe her vote was properly recorded and
tallied, the voter must trust election oﬃcials in her district, the technicians that set
up the machines, the programmers that wrote the software, and the engineers that
designed the hardware. She needs to trust that the machines were stored in a way
that prevents tampering, and that they have been properly monitored since being
removed from storage. She needs to trust that they will be securely delivered to the
counting location after the polls close.
Since this issue has come to the forefront in 2000, there has been a push to in-
tegrate security into voting systems and thereby eliminate the reliance on trusted
third parties. In particular, many have focused on the problem of trusting that the
voting machine has recorded the proper vote. Of the two common types of cryp-
tographic voting schemes, only mixnets have proposals for addressing this problem.
David Chaum [7] has proposed using visual cryptography to allow the voter to verify
that the ballot encrypts the correct choices. Andrew Neﬀ has proposed [19] using
receipts with codes corresponding to particular candidates. No such proposals exist
for homomorphic encryption voting systems, which have the advantage maintaining
greater privacy by never revealing the contents of individual ballots.
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The goal of this thesis is to provide a secure and private homomorphic voter-
veriﬁed election scheme. Chapter 2 of this thesis examines current voting technologies,
and Chapter 3 surveys existing cryptographic research in voting. Chapter 4 proposes
a new homomorphic scheme with a process for the voter to verify that the machine
records and counts her vote properly. The voter is presented with several possible
encrypted ballots and asked to choose one among them to use to cast her vote.
The remaining ballots are decrypted to reveal whether they were properly formed
by the voting machine. This straightforward “cut and choose” protocol provides a
probabilistic proof of the voting machine’s correctness. Section 4.4 presents a Java
implementation that was created to demonstrate the scheme. Finally, Chapter 5
compares the new scheme to those proposed by Chaum and Neﬀ, and discusses areas
for future work.
13
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Chapter 2
A Brief Analysis of Current Voting
Technologies
This chapter will provide a brief discussion of voting systems used in current elec-
tions. This thesis focuses on electronic systems, but it is important to understand the
advantages and disadvantages of both paper-based and electronic systems. Section
2.1 analyzes paper-based systems and Section 2.2 focuses on electronic systems and
the arguments for and against voter veriﬁcation.
A more thorough survey of the topic can be found in the Caltech/MIT Voting
Technology Project’s report [24]. The Election Reform Information Project has a
series of brieﬁngs [25] on election reform topics such as security.
2.1 Paper-based voting systems
Auditability is the primary argument for paper systems. If ballots are stored safely
and securely, there can be as many independent audits as needed. The fact that the
audits can be independent is especially important. Each recount involves examining
the original ballots, as marked and veriﬁed by the voter, rather than relying on a
machine’s recording of the ballots.
The second major advantage of paper-based ballots, voter veriﬁability, has become
more prominent since the 2000 U.S. presidential election. Many have looked to paper
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systems to guarantee voters that their ballots were cast as intended because all paper-
based systems involve permanently marking a piece of paper. After a voter makes her
choice, she can visually inspect the paper to ensure the correct choice is indicated. As
long as the voter selects a candidate, the vote indicated cannot be changed without
invalidating the race or ballot.
The primary types of paper systems are hand-counted, punch-card, and optical-
scan ballots. They diﬀer in the method of marking choices and tabulating the results.
The paper systems vary in ease of use and ease of tabulation.
Both hand-counted and optical-scan ballots are marked by hand using a marker
or pen. The voter is asked to ﬁll in an oval, put an “x” in a box, or complete a line
to indicate her choice. If the ballot is designed well, this is a very intuitive action,
and it is readily apparent to the voter which choice she has selected.
Using a punch-card ballot involves punching a hole to indicate a choice. The
voter is provided with a device that maps ballot locations to ballot choices, and must
punch holes to indicate her choices. This action is complicated, and it is often diﬃcult
for users to associate their choices with the holes they punched, especially after the
ballot is removed from the polling device. This reduces the voter’s ability to verify
her choice.
With respect to tabulation, hand-counting is infeasible for elections on the scale
of US national elections [24]. It is too slow, expensive, and cumbersome given the
complexity of the ballots. However, hand-counting remains a backup method of
auditing all paper-based systems. A hand-count of a small statistical sample can
trigger a full recount if the distribution of votes diﬀers signiﬁcantly from that of the
electronic or mechanical count.
Optical-scan tabulators are more portable and less expensive than punch-card
machines, which makes it easier for them to be placed in polling locations. In-precinct
scanning allows an invalid ballot to be rejected immediately, so that the voter has an
opportunity to try again. The VTP [24] report shows that precinct-scan setups can
reduce the number of uncounted ballots by 50%.
The punch-card machines are more expensive and cumbersome and have been
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shown to lose more votes than both hand-counted and optical scan systems [24].
This was highlighted during the 2000 presidential election when the Florida recount
was bogged down by punch-cards with holes that were not deﬁnitively punched [15].
2.2 Electronic voting systems
There are two main groups of supporters for electronic voting systems: voters inter-
ested in the convenience and usability of the systems, and election oﬃcials interested
in a simpler, more ﬂexible, and less costly system. No studies that conclusively demon-
strate that electronic voting is more usable exist, mainly because there are so many
diﬀerent systems. This technology is also in its infancy and the cited advantages are
not necessarily apparent in current systems.
2.2.1 Usability advantages of DREs
The length of current ballots creates problems for paper-based systems. Elections are
rarely a one-race aﬀair and there are typically many more than two candidates for each
race. Elections are also used as an opportunity to present referenda on public issues,
which are typically written using legal terminology and are diﬃcult to understand.
The result ballots that are often double sided and printed in small font sizes. Even
with the Federal Election Commission’s mandated minimum 6.3 mm character size
[9], many elderly and impaired voters are unable to read ballot text.
Electronic systems do not need to display all of the ballot information at once;
instead races can be displayed individually. This allows the font size to be increased.
For voters with vision impairments, there could be settings with even larger font sizes
and greater contrast.
The issues of ballot design go far beyond font size. The ballots should be designed
to convey which candidates are running in which races and how to cast a vote for
each candidate. However, many current designs fail to do this well, and voters miss
key information [24].
An under-vote occurs when a voter does not select a candidate for a race. While it
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is allowable for a voter to choose not to vote in a race, if the voter casts an under-vote
because she did not see the race, it is an error. With large and complicated ballots,
these errors are more common.
With DRE machines, races can be presented individually. The voter can be forced
to either choose a candidate or acknowledge that she is not voting in the race. This
could reduce under-votes because the voter must explicitly choose not to vote in a
particular race.
Using a paper-based ballot, a voter can mark multiple selections for a race where
only one selection is allowed. This is known as an over-vote. Whether this is due to
stray marks or confusion, the result is that the voter’s choice is invalidated because
election oﬃcials are unable to determine the voter’s intent. A computer can disallow
selecting more than the allowed number of candidates and thereby eliminate over-
votes.
Another advantage of DREs is the voter’s ability to change her ballot without the
intervention of election oﬃcials. If a voter marks her ballot, then wishes to change
her choice, most paper-based systems would require that she turn in her old ballot.
This policy results in a lack of privacy for the voter, who may have only marked one
choice incorrectly and is now forced to reveal the rest of her choices. To avoid this,
electronic systems allow voters to change their votes without any intervention from
election oﬃcials. Whether doing so is simple and straightforward depends largely on
the user interface.
The extent to which the improvements discussed above are present is dependent
on the quality of the user interface. Many current DREs do not achieve these im-
provements. If electronic systems become widely used, the user interface is sure to
improve as more vendors compete to deliver electronic voting systems, and as data
about the usability of individual systems becomes available.
Accessibility and DRE systems
The American Association of Disabled People (AADP) is one of the most vocal voting
groups supporting the DRE voting machines. The AADP favors the machines because
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they are more accessible than any current systems – in particular, they allow disabled
people to cast secret ballots. With paper-based systems, many disabled people rely
on another person to ﬁll out their ballots; this destroys the secrecy of the process and
leaves such voters wondering if their votes were cast as intended.
DRE machines can be adapted to accommodate disabilities and allow such voters
to vote without assistance. Vision-impaired voters can use headphones and systems
that provide verbal feedback. Mobility-impaired voters can use alternative input
mechanisms to make their selections. These features provide disabled voters with
the ability to vote unassisted, an ability most voters take for granted. In addition to
increasing accessibility and improving the secrecy of voting for disabled people, these
features are mandated by the Help America Vote Act [22].
2.2.2 Logistical advantages of DREs
For election oﬃcials, DREs provide the potential to reduce costs and alleviate many
problems in current processes. Using paper-based voting systems, election oﬃcials
must securely and eﬃciently print, distribute, transport, and count millions of ballots.
Managing this paper is an enormous logistical feat, and even with many years of
accumulated wisdom, election oﬃcials have not gotten it entirely right. Voting experts
regularly describe lapses of security such as ballot boxes that are unaccounted for
hours after the polls close, a time period during which they could easily be altered
[24].
Each voting district, and possibly each polling location, may have a diﬀerent ballot
due to diﬀerences in local races. In primary elections, there must be diﬀerent ballots
for each party. Many voting districts must also provide ballots in diﬀerent languages
for voters who are not native speakers of English. (In some cases, it is not even
possible to print ballots, as certain native languages in Alaska and the northwest have
no written form.) The result is an enormous number of ballots that must be printed
and distributed to speciﬁc locations. Electronic voting machines can easily support
multiple ballots, and could even support audio ballots for non-written languages.
The diﬀerences between ballots prevent voters from voting at an alternate polling
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location if the assigned location is not conveniently located. Electronic voting may
allow voters to easily vote at an unassigned polling location.
Undeniably, maintaining the security of paper ballots after they are cast is ex-
tremely diﬃcult, especially if they are counted centrally as they are in many large
districts. Additionally, oﬃcials must retain and securely store ballots for 22 months
after they are cast [9]. With DREs, transferring ballots to a central location is re-
duced to setting up a secure connection to the polling locations or transporting a
small amount of electronic material, rather than boxes of paper. Storing ballots
on electronic media requires much less physical space, and the media can be easily
destroyed when no longer needed.
Another major problem with paper ballots is the diﬃculty of counting them.
Hand-counting has the advantage of being easily observed by multiple parties, but is
largely impractical with voting districts as large as Los Angeles County, which has
almost four million registered voters [17]. Automated methods, such as optical scan
ballots, speed up the process but vote counts can be inconsistent, as ballots may be
marked in ways that are unclear to the machines, resulting in recounts that diﬀer
from the original counts even if no fraud exists [12]. DRE machines produce ﬁnal
vote counts instantaneously and consistently. Consistency and speed are appealing
to voting oﬃcials because the voting public appreciates immediate and deﬁnitive
results.
DRE voting machines have a high initial cost, but the repeat cost of individual
elections is lower than with paper-based systems. Printing ballots is very expensive
and must be done for each election. The VTP report [24] calculated that DRE
machine with a life span of 15 years is more expensive than an optical scan machine
over the same time period. However, if the machine lasts 20 years, the cost is the
same.
2.2.3 Disadvantages of DREs
The major criticism of the DRE voting systems is that they give voters no conﬁdence
that the machines are doing the proper thing. After a voter submits her ballot, she has
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no way of knowing that the machine is recording and counting the vote as entered.
To believe this occurred, the voter must trust that the vendors did not intend to
misrecord votes, that the software developers performed their job competently, that
the software was properly certiﬁed, and that the machine is running the certiﬁed
software. This also assumes that the certiﬁcation standards are high enough to ensure
proper security.
The problem with trusting the vendors’ intent is that the companies making these
machines may not be unbiased parties. The companies that produce voting machines,
as well as the executives that run those companies, have a history of supporting and
donating to particular political campaigns[29]. Furthermore, some of the oﬃcials
responsible for selecting and regulating electronic voting equipment are elected. There
is clearly a conﬂict of interest in these cases.
In other situations where partisan individuals are responsible for critical electoral
processes, eﬀorts are made to disclose their actions as much as possible and to allow
members of any political group to participate. One example is the presence of party
observers at poll closings. Poll workers, themselves of varying political beliefs, are
watched by representatives of any candidates that choose to provide them. Imposing
a similar process on the production of voting machines is not feasible.
Vendors claim that suspicions of bias are unfounded because the software must
go through a veriﬁcation process. However, detecting intentionally faulty software
is very diﬃcult. For example, a Rice University professor asked computer science
students to introduce bugs into a simple voting system and asked other students to
examine the code for bugs [2]. Despite a small code base, only 2,000 lines, some
bugs went undetected. Compare this to commercial voting systems with over 50,000
lines of code [2]. Even with professionally trained auditors, malicious bugs could go
undetected.
Beyond the issue of vendor intent is the problem of vendor competency. It is
extremely diﬃcult to achieve correctness in software, as evidenced by the bugs dis-
covered in commercial software on a daily basis. While some bugs are to be expected,
some of those discovered in current election systems provide very little conﬁdence in
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those writing the software. One of the more publicized such bugs was the hard-coding
of keys into the software [30]. This meant that every election district using that soft-
ware had the same key, and that the key could not be changed without changing the
underlying software. These keys were used to encrypt all of the ballots and to set up
the memory cards used to authenticate voters. Knowledge of these keys could allow
an adversary to cast extra votes, among other things.
One way of reassuring the public of the impartiality and correctness of the voting
system is to test the system using predeﬁned standards. Currently, election systems
are certiﬁed by individual states, based on results from both federal and state tests.
These tests generally include auditing the code for errors. The current process is
considered inadequate by many, especially because “commercial oﬀ the shelf” software
is allowed to be included without being audited for errors. Commercial oﬀ the shelf
software, such as operating systems purchased by vendors from other companies, is
used as-is in the voting machines. The current process also treats certiﬁcation as
a one-time process and does not provide an opportunity for citizen involvement or
signiﬁcant public disclosure [12]. The result is that voter conﬁdence is not particularly
high. An improved certiﬁcation process would help improve trust, but examining the
code and running tests can never completely ensure correctness, especially if the
programmer is malicious.
Another way of improving security and gaining public trust is to require that
voting machine software be open source. This solves the problem of transparency by
allowing the public to participate in the development process as coders or observers.
However, open source based voting machines are not likely to be proﬁtable. A more
limited approach would be to make the source code publicly available for evaluation
only. In the end, open source can not completely eliminate errors or malicious code,
although it may improve public trust.
Even if code can be certiﬁed such that the public has complete conﬁdence in it, this
will not ensure that the software running on the voting machines is the certiﬁed code.
Vendors have a history of putting uncertiﬁed software onto voting machines without
the knowledge of the election districts [29, 31]. This problem can be prevented with
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rigorous oversight of the installation process and using hash libraries [21] to compare
installed software to certiﬁed software. These measures may slow down the process
of ﬁxing bugs, but they will make the maintenance of the software more transparent
to the public.
Other voting systems have similar problems with achieving trust, but manage to
avoid the criticism heaped on DREs because it is possible to recover from fraud by
recounting ballots. DRE voting machines have no meaningful recount ability. Optical
scan machines use software that is susceptible to the same fraud and correctness errors
as DREs, but the ballots are not aﬀected by such errors. Optical-scan ballots can
be manually recounted if necessary. In contrast, the only copies of the ballot on a
DRE machine are the ones the machine chooses to store. Even if large errors such as
obvious candidate bias are detected, no recovery is possible.
2.2.4 DREs and voter veriﬁcation
It is clear that there are many reasons to worry about the DRE machines, even if some
problems can be alleviated in the long term. The question of providing assurance that
a voter’s vote is cast as intended and counted properly remains to be solved. Some
form of “voter veriﬁcation” is necessary. Rebecca Mercuri was apparently the ﬁrst
to suggest that DREs print a paper receipt that the voter cannot take home [18].
The machines would print out a receipt behind a glass window, so that the voter
would be prevented from marking or removing it. The voter would then have the
opportunity to examine the receipt before choosing to submit her vote. If approved
by the voter, the receipt would be put into a sealed ballot box. The receipt serves as
a “voter veriﬁed paper trail” or “voter veriﬁed paper audit trail.” This method makes
recounts possible, since the paper ballots approved by the voter can be recounted.
While the idea of a voter veriﬁed paper trail has gained support from many law-
makers and computer scientists, there are also many who strongly object to them.
Using the term “contemporaneous paper trail,” they criticize the eﬀectiveness, ex-
pense, and feasibility of such a system [28].
When using voter veriﬁed paper trails the question is, “What is the oﬃcial bal-
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lot?” While state laws will ultimately determine the answer, the paper ballot, not
the electronic ballot, is supposed to provide the ﬁnal vote count in the event of a
challenge. Essentially, the DRE machine has become a device that records the ballot
on paper and maintains an unoﬃcial count. The obvious problem is that many of the
disadvantages of a paper-based voting system are retained, including some printing
costs, the expense of storing the receipts, and the diﬃculty of managing the paper
securely at all times.
Paper trails also reduce the usability of DRE machines for disabled voters. The
vision-impaired would not be able to verify the paper receipt, and many object to
such systems because resources used for creating and maintaining paper trails could be
used instead to improve the overall accessibility of the machines [22]. The practicality
of these machines is another serious issue. Many opponents point to the possibility
that the printers will fail as a new election day disaster [28].
The goal of the voter veriﬁed paper audit trails is worth pursuing. A voter should
be able to convince herself that her vote was recorded as she intended and that the
vote was included in the ﬁnal tally. However, counting paper ballots is a technological
step backwards. Instead, modern cryptography can oﬀer similar assurances without
losing the advantages of modern electronic systems.
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Chapter 3
Use of Cryptography in Voting
Systems
The main problem with current DRE systems is that they require a large amount
of trust from the election oﬃcials, who are either elected oﬃcials themselves or else
appointed by elected oﬃcials. However, there has been a signiﬁcant amount of re-
search on providing cryptographic schemes that reduce this burden of trust. A more
detailed survey of the topic can be found in Secure Electronic Voting [13].
The problem is that cryptography is often added as an afterthought, rather than
than as an integral part of the voting system. An end-to-end scheme allows the voter
to verify that her vote was cast as she intended and that the ballot cast was included
in the ﬁnal tally. This should all occur in a secure manner that ensures a fair election
while maintaining the privacy of the voters.
There are three general classes of cryptographic voting protocols: those based on
blind signatures, those based on mix-nets, and those using homomorphic encryption.
Historically, cryptographic research has focused on proving that the tally is the sum
of all the ballots, and that the contents of individual ballots remain secret. Crypto-
graphic voting research considered the voter and the polling booth to be one entity.
In 2004, two new mix-net based schemes due to Chaum [7] and Neﬀ [20] were pro-
posed that provide true end-to-end veriﬁcation and enable the voter to verify that
the voting machine recorded the correct vote.
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Section 3.1 describes homomorphic encryption and its applications to voting. Mix-
net voting systems are described in section 3.2, and two voter-veriﬁable mix-net
schemes are discussed in section 3.3.
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is naturally suited to election schemes. It allows the votes
to be tabulated before decryption, improving privacy. For example, in additive homo-
morphic encryption, the product of two ciphertexts is a third ciphertext that encrypts
the sum of the two original plaintexts.
More generally, let ⊥ be an operation, m1, m2 be two messages, and let E[m] rep-
resents the encryption of the message m under an encryption scheme. The scheme is
homomorphic for the operation ⊥ if you can easily ﬁnd a ciphertext c = E(m1⊥m2)
from E(m1) and E(m2). That is, the operation ⊥ can be performed on the under-
lying messages without revealing them. For election systems, a scheme where ⊥ is a
addition is most useful.
Voting applications may use additive homomorphism to allow tallying to be done
before decryption. With other forms of encryption, all the ballots are dissociated from
their identifying pieces of information and then decrypted and tallied. If homomorphic
encryption is used, the tallying can be done while the votes are still encrypted, and the
ﬁnal total can then be decrypted. This eﬀectively hides the contents of the original
ballots while providing an publicly computable tally.
Section 3.1.1 presents a basic two-candidate homomorphic election scheme. Sec-
tion 3.1.2 describes Paillier encryption, while 3.1.3 proves the security and one-
wayness of the scheme. Possible improvements to the basic scheme are discussed
in 3.1.4, and an expanded multi-candidate version is described in 3.1.5.
3.1.1 A very basic homomorphic encryption scheme
Before introducing the Paillier encryption scheme, it is necessary to examine exactly
how homomorphism can be used in an election protocol.
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The most basic type of election is a two-candidate race with v voters where ev-
eryone raises their hand for their preferred candidate. To construct an equivalent
electronic system, let 0 represent a vote for the ﬁrst candidate and 1 represent a vote
for the second. Everyone posts their vote in some public manner. If the sum of all the
votes is less than v/2, the ﬁrst candidate wins. If it is greater, the second candidate
wins. If the sum is exactly equal to v/2, there is a tie. However, this scheme obviously
lacks privacy. If each voter instead posted a homomorphic encryption of her vote, the
encrypted ballots could be multiplied and then decrypted to ﬁnd a plaintext sum of
the votes.
There are many issues with this simplistic approach. The ﬁrst is that there is no
proof that the voter submitted a valid vote. Instead of an encryption of 0 or 1, the
voter could submit an encryption of a larger number or a negative number and thereby
corrupt the sum. Potential for fraud also exists in the decryption operation – it must
be done in a veriﬁable way. Giving any one authority the power to decrypt can also
threaten the privacy of individual votes because that authority now has access to the
contents of every voter’s ballot. Most races contain more than two candidates, so the
candidates must be encoded in a way that preserves the summation property. Another
major issue for homomorphic election schemes is support for write-in candidates.
3.1.2 Paillier encryption
A public-key encryption scheme frequently used in homomorphic voting systems was
designed by Pascal Paillier [23]. It is additively homomorphic and computationally
eﬃcient to decrypt. It will be the basis of the scheme proposed in chapter 4.
Paillier encryption is provably secure and one-way based on the Decisional Com-
posite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA) and the Computational Composite Resid-
uosity Assumption (CCRA). We present here an explanation of the scheme drawn
from the original paper [23].
Let p and q be two large primes and n = p∗q. Two functions we will use frequently
are Euler’s totient function (φ) and Carmichael’s function (λ). For n, the product of
two primes, φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1) and λ(n) = lcm(p− 1, q − 1). These functions are
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used because they have nice properties over the multiplicative group Z∗n2 :
|Z∗n2 | = φ(n2) = nφ(n);
and
wλ(n) = 1 (mod n),
wnλ(n) = 1 (mod n2),
for any w ∈ Z∗n2 .
We will also make use of the function L(u) = (u−1)/n, ∀u ∈ {u|u = 1 (mod n)}.
A common term in modular arithmetic is residue, where a is a residue of b modulo
n if a = b (mod n). A number z is said to be an n-th residue modulo n2 if there exists
a y ∈ Z∗n2 such that z = yn (mod n2). Each n-th residue z modulo n2 has n such
roots y less than n [23]. The set of all n-th residues is a multiplicative subgroup of
Z∗n2 . Each n-th residue z has n roots, of which exactly 1 is less than n. In particular,
the n-th roots of 1, called the n-th roots of unity, are (1+n)x = 1+xn (mod n2) for
x ∈ {0, · · · , n− 1}.
We can now deﬁne the function εg, which maps Zn × Z∗n to Z∗n2 :
εg(x, y) = g
x ∗ yn (mod n2)
This will be our encryption function, where x is a message encrypted under public
key g. To use εg as an encryption function, we need to show it is bijective in message
for a ﬁxed key. If we choose g such that the order of g is a nonzero multiple of n, εg
can be inverted.
Lemma 1 (equivalent to Lemma 3 from [23]): If the order of g is a nonzero
multiple of n then εg is a bijective map from Zn × Z∗n to Z∗n2.
Proof: [Proof expanded from Paillier’s original paper [23].] We will show εg is
bijective for g when g has order equal to αn for all α ∈ {1, · · ·λ(n)}.
Let h be the order of g. To show that εg is injective, we will demonstrate that for
any c ∈ Z∗n2 , x1, x2 ∈ Zn, y1, y2 ∈ Z∗n, c = εg(x1, y1) = εg(x2, y2) if and only if x1 = x2
and y1 = y2. Let
gx1yn1 = g
x2yn2 (mod n
2),
which can be simpliﬁed to
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gx1−x2(y1y−12 )
n = 1 (mod n2).
We can then raise both sides to λ(n) and get
gλ(n)(x1−x2)(y1y−12 )
λ(n)n = 1 (mod n2).
When we introduced the function λ(n), we also made the following statement: for
all w ∈ Z∗n2 , wλ(n)n = 1 (mod n2). This implies
gλ(n)(x1−x2) = 1 (mod n2).
From this, we know that λ(n)(x1−x2) is a multiple of g’s order, h. By deﬁnition,
gcd(λ(n), n) = 1, therefore x1 − x2 = 0 (mod n) and x1 = x2 (mod n).
If we go back to
gx1−x2(y1y−12 )n = 1 (mod n2),
we can now determine that (y1y
−1
2 )
n = 1 (mod n2), which makes y1y
−1
2 an n-th
root of 1. The roots of 1 take the form 1 + βn for β ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}, therefore
y1y
−1
2 = 1 + βn (mod n
2) and y1 = y2 + y2βn (mod n
2). From this we get y1 = y2
(mod n). Therefore, εg is injective for the chosen g.
Using Euler’s totient function, we can show that the two groups Zn×Z∗n and Z∗n2
each have nφ(n) elements and are therefore the mapping is surjective.
In practice, we ﬁnd g with an order that is a nonzero multiple of n by choosing a
random element of Z∗n2 and testing if gcd(L(g
λ(n) (mod n2)), n) = 1 as described by
Paillier [23].
Lemma 2: gcd(L(gλ(n) (mod n2)), n) = 1 implies the order of g is αn for some
α ∈ {1, · · · , λ(n)}.
Proof: Let the order of g modulo n2 be h. By Carmichael’s formula, h divides
λ(n2) = λ(n)n. Therefore, gλ(n) = 1 (mod n) and gλ(n) = (1 + n)x (mod n2) for
some x ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}. The order of (1 + n)x modulo n2 is n ∗ 1/x (mod φ(n2))
because (1 + n)n = 1 (mod n2). Similarly, the order of gλ(n) is h/λ(n). We can now
see that h ∗ 1/λ(n) = n ∗ 1/x (mod φ(n2)) or xh = λ(n)n (mod φ(n2)).
Given this, we can express L(gλ(n) (mod n2)) as L(1 + xn (mod n2)) = x. We
can now simplify gcd(L(gλ(n) (mod n2)), n) = 1 to gcd(x, n) = 1. Given this and
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that xh = λ(n)n mod φ(n2), n must divide h and the order of g is a nonzero multiple
of n.
We can now deﬁne Paillier’s encryption scheme, the ﬁrst described by Paillier [23].
The public key is (n, g), where n is a product of two large primes and g is chosen such
that εg is bijective. The secret key is λ(n). To encrypt the message m ∈ Zn under
public key (n, g), we choose a random r ∈ Z∗n and use
Eg[m, r] = εg(m, r) = g
mrn (mod n2).
To decrypt the ciphertext c with private key λ(n) we use
Dg[c] =
L(cλ(n) (mod n2))
L(gλ(n) (mod n2))
(mod n).
The g will be omitted from Eg and Dg when it is obvious from the context.
Lemma 3:Given c = E[m, r], D[c] = m. [Equivalent to Lemma 7 of [23]].
Proof: [Proof expanded from Paillier’s original paper [23].] We ﬁrst substitute in
c = gmrn (mod n2) to get
D[c] = L(g
λ(n)mrλ(n)n (mod n2))
L(gλ(n) (mod n2))
(mod n).
From Carmichael’s formula, rλ(n)n = 1 (mod n2) and gλ(n) is an n-th root of unity
and equals xn + 1 mod n2 for some x ∈ {0, · · · , n− 1}. This gives us
D[c] = L((xn+1)
m (mod n2))
L(xn+1 (mod n2))
(mod n).
We can simplify (xn + 1)m (mod n2) to mnx + 1 (mod n2) and end up with
D[c] = mx
x
(mod n) = m (mod n).
One of the main advantages of Paillier encryption is that it is additively homo-
morphic. If we choose some m1, m2 ∈ Zn and r1, r2 ∈ Z∗n, and let
c1 = E[m1, r1] and
c2 = E[m2, r2], we have
c3 = c1 ∗ c2 (mod n2) = E[(m1 + m2 (mod n), r3], for some r3 ∈ Z∗n.
Lemma 4: Paillier encryption is additively homomorphic. [Equivalent to Lemma
5 of [23].]
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Proof: Let c1 = E[m1, r1] = g
m1rn1 (mod n
2), c2 = E[m2, r2] = g
m2rn2 (mod n
2).
We get
c3 = c1 ∗ c2 = gm1+m2(r1r2)n (mod n2).
This will decrypt to m1 + m2.
Security and one-way properties of Paillier Encryption
The problem of distinguishing an n-th residue from a non-n-th residue modulo n2 is
referred to as the Composite Residuosity problem, or CR[n]. An important property
of CR[n] is that it is randomly self-reducible: a particular instance of the problem
can be randomly transformed into a derived instance and a solution to the derived
instance can be transformed into a solution to the original instance. That is, if we
are given an oracle O that answers CR[n] for a random z ∈ Z∗n2 with probability ρ,
with have an ρ chance of using O to determine CR[n] of a particular w ∈ Z∗n2 .
Lemma 5: CR[n] is randomly self-reducible over w ∈ Z∗n2.
Proof: Given w ∈ Z∗n2 , we let w′ = w ∗ rn (mod n2), where r ∈R Z∗n2 . If O
provides an answer to CR[n] for w′, the same answer can be returned for CR[n] for
w. Otherwise, fail.
To see that this works, consider the two possible cases. If w is an n-th residue,
there will exist a root y such that w = yn mod n2. Therefore, w′ = yn ∗ rn (mod n2)
and will be an n-th residue. If w is not an n-th residue, w′ cannot be an n-th because
rn mod n2 is an n-th residue and n-th residues modulo n2 are a multiplicative group.
If r is chosen randomly from Z∗n2 , w
′ will be randomly distributed in Z∗n2 and the
probability of choosing it such that O will answer CR[n] is ρ. Therefore, CR[n] is
randomly self-reducible over all possible w ∈ Z∗n2 .
The assumption that deciding CR[n] is computationally hard is referred to as the
Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA). This is dependent only the
choice of n due to random self-reducibility.
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Theorem 1 (equivalent to Theorem 15 from [23]): Paillier encryption is
semantically secure if and only if DCRA holds.
Proof: [Proof expanded from Paillier’s original paper [23].] We will ﬁrst show
that if Paillier encryption is semantically secure, DCRA holds, by proving the con-
trapositive. Given m0, m1 ∈ Zn and c ∈ Z∗n2 , where c is the encryption of either
m0 or m1, we need to determine which message c encrypts. We are also given an
oracle ODCRA(w) which returns whether w is an n-th residue modulo n. If c = gm0rn1
(mod n2), cg−m0 = rn1 (mod n
2) and will be an n-th residue. Therefore, if and only
if ODCRA(cg−m0) is true, c is an encryption of m0.
We will now show that if DCRA holds, Paillier encryption is semantically secure.
Given w ∈ Z∗n2 and an oracle for Paillier encryption, we can determine whether w is
an n-th residue modulo n2 by constructing c = gxw (mod n2), x ∈ Z∗n, and giving c
and x to the oracle. If it accepts c as a valid encryption of x, w is an n-th residue
modulo n2.
Therefore, Paillier encryption is semantically secure based on DCRA.
To prove the one-wayness of Paillier encryption, we will introduce the n-th Resid-
uosity Class Problem of base g, or Class[n, g]. This is the problem of computing
x ∈ Z∗n2 given w = εg(x, y). This problem is randomly self-reducible over both w and
g.
Lemma 6 (equivalent to Lemma 6 from [23]): Class[n, g] is random self-
reducible over w ∈ Z∗n2.
Proof: [Proof from Paillier’s original paper [23].] We are given n, the product
of two primes, g, a member of Z∗n2 with an order that is a nonzero multiple of n,
and w ∈ Z∗n2 . We can create a random instance w′ = wgγωn (mod n2), where
γ ∈R Zn, ω ∈R Z∗n. Let x′ be the result of the Class[n, g] oracle on w′. We can solve
for
x = x′ − α (mod n).
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Lemma 7 (equivalent to Lemma 7 from [23]): Class[n, g] is randomly self-
reducible over all g with order equal to αn for some α ∈ {1, · · · , λ(n)n}. That is, for
all g1, g2 with orders a nonzero multiple of n, Class[n, g1] is equivalent to Class[n, g2].
Proof: [Proof expanded from Paillier’s original paper [23].] Earlier we showed εg
to be bijective, so we can assume inverses exist for all proper g. For any w ∈ Z∗n2 ,
there exists (x1, y1) = ε
−1
g1 (w) and (x2, y2) = ε
−1
g2 (w), x1, x2 ∈ Zn and y1, y2 ∈ Z∗n. Let
(z, y3) = ε
−1
g1
(g2). Therefore, g2 = εg1(z, y3) = g
z
1y
n
3 (mod n
2).
We can substitute in for g2 in w = εg2(x2, y2) and get
w = (εg1(z, y3))
x2yn2 (mod n
2).
We can simplify to get w = gzx2(y2y
x2
3 )
n (mod n2) and w = εg1(zx2, y2y
x2
3 ).
However, we know that ε is bijective, therefore x1 = x2z (mod n). Another way
of expressing this is Dg1[w] = Dg2 [w]Dg1[g2]. We can also establish that Dg[g] = 1
for all proper g by observing g = εg(x, y) = g
xyn (mod n2) for x, y = 1. Using this
identity, we get Dg1[g1] = Dg2 [g1]Dg1[g2].
If we have an oracle for Class[n, g1] we can determine Class[n, g2] of w by asking
the oracle for ε−1g1 (g2) and ε
−1
g1 (w) and solving ε
−1
g2 (w) = ε
−1
g1 (w)ε
−1
g1 (g2). Therefore,
Class[n, g] is random self-reducible over g.
Class[n] is Class[n, g] for a speciﬁc g, conditioned only on n. Due to random
self-reducibility, this is equivalent to Class[n, g]. The Computational Composite
Residuosity Assumption (CCRA) is the conjecture that Class[n] is intractable. It
is obvious that Paillier encryption is one-way if and only if CCRA holds because
inverting Paillier is by deﬁnition the Composite Residuosity Class Problem.
Paillier’s original paper [23] connects the DCRA and CCRA to several problems
generally believed to be in intractable. Class[n], the basis of CCRA, is reducible to
factoring n and CR[n], the basis of DCRA, is reducible to Class[n].
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3.1.3 Improved homomorphic encryption schemes
Since Paillier ﬁrst proposed his encryption scheme and suggested its relevancy to
voting, there have been many diﬀerent approaches to the problems mentioned at the
end of 3.1.1.
One scheme is the multi-candidate, multi-authority scheme proposed by Baudron,
Fouque, Pointcheval, Poupard, and Stern [3]. It allows races with multiple candidates
and makes use of threshold cryptography to distribute the private decryption key
among multiple authorities. The distribution of the key in this manner safe-guards
the voters’ privacy against malicious authorities. This scheme also adds veriﬁcation
to the encryption and decryption stages of the election scheme.
Another homomorphic voting scheme is the vector-ballot approach proposed by
Kiayias and Yung [16]. This scheme is unique in its attempt to support write-in
candidates. It makes use of mix-nets to anonymize the write-in ballots but the rest
of the system takes advantage of the eﬃciency of homomorphic encryption.
3.1.4 Multi-candidate homomorphic election systems
Drawing from Baudron, Fogue, Pointcheval, Poupard, and Stern [3], this section de-
scribes a multi-candidate election scheme based on Paillier homomorphic encryption.
To set up a k-candidate election for v voters, we choose a m to be an integer
greater than v. Note that m can be any integer greater than v and can be chosen to
be something computationally convenient such as the next power of 2 larger than v.
The public key n = pq must be greater than mk, g will be chosen in the usual way.
The candidates must be assigned an ordering and candidate i ∈ {0, · · · , k − 1} will
be uniquely represented as mi = m
i.
To vote for candidate i, the voter must encrypt mi under the public key (n, g).
She will then need to provide a zero-knowledge proof that her ballot is an encryption
of a valid vote. To prove that ballot b = E[mi, r] = g
mirn, r ∈R Zn for some
mi ∈ M = {m0, · · · , mk−1} the voter must present a zero-knowledge proof. We use
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs because this information will be posted publicly
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and we wish to preserve the privacy of the voters while still allowing for universal
veriﬁcation.
To use the proof described by Baudron, Fouque, Pointcheval, Poupard, and Stern
[3], the voting machine would compute k− 1 values, one for each unchosen candidate
in the ﬁnal ballot, based on the ciphertext and the unused messages. The veriﬁer gives
the machine a random challenge to which it must respond with the computed values
and one ﬁnal value computed based on the challenge. This prevents cheating by the
voting machine because it is not possible to compute the ﬁnal value if the ciphertext
does not encrypt a message from M . This particular proof has length O(k), but an
O(log(k)) proof has been described Damgard, Jurik and Nielsen [11].
After the ballots bi are submitted for all i ∈ {0, · · · , v − 1}, we can accumulate
and decrypt them. Let B =
∏
i bi (mod n
2) be the accumulated ballots. T = D[B] is
the decrypted sum of all the votes. We then need to determine the number of votes
for each candidate. If we interpret T as an m-ary number, T = {mk−1, · · · , m1, m0},
we can determine the ﬁnal tallies for each candidate.
3.2 Mix-nets
This section describes a generic mix-net voting system, an alternative approach to
cryptographic voting systems. This category of voting schemes is interesting because
there are proposals that incorporate end-to-end veriﬁcation into the mix-net protocol.
Mix-nets were introduced by David Chaum [8] as a way to anonymize email.
Like ballots in an election, the goal was to dissociate the encrypted message from
its sender. To ensure privacy, multiple authorities share key information, and the
identity of the sender can only be determined if multiple authorities conspire. In
voting, the authorities are usually opposing organizations such as political parties.
There are two types of mix-nets: decryption and reencryption. In a decryption
mix-net, the messages are encrypted under all of the authorities’ public keys and each
authority partially decrypts the message. For a reencryption mix-net, the message is
encrypted under a shared public key and reencrypted under each authority’s private
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key. The following description focuses on decryption mix-nets.
If an election has v voters and a authorities, a basic mix-net election can be run in
the following manner. Let PKi, SKi be the public/private key pair of authority i, for
all i = 0, . . . , a− 1 for encryption function EPKi[x] and decryption function DSKi[x].
Let PK be a key that combines PKi for all i. In the case of El Gamal encryption,
which is described later in this section, PK is simply the product of all PKi. Each
voter encrypts her ballot bj , for all j = 0, . . . , v − 1, with PK to get cj,0 and posts it
publicly.
When all v votes are posted, the ﬁrst authority chooses a random permutation of
the set {0, · · · , v − 1}, π0, to reorder the elements and partially decrypts all of the
ciphertexts with SK0. It outputs cπ0(j),1 = DSK0[cj,0] for all j = 0, . . . , v − 1 to the
public board. This is considered one stage of the mixing. All of the following stages
are performed in a similar manner.
After reordering and partially decrypting, an authority then must prove that all
the ballots that entered this stage also left it. A simple probabilistic method is to
challenge the authority by randomly choosing half of the inputs and asking for proof
that they correspond to outputs [14]. This could potentially lead to some privacy
loss if the correspondence can be traced from the input ballot and voter to the ﬁnal
decrypted ballot. Instead, each authority can be responsible for two stages of mixing
[7]. Again, half of the inputs are randomly chosen as challenges. Any output of
the ﬁrst stage that was not part of the challenge, becomes a challenge for the second
stage. This prevents one ballot from being part of more than two successive challenges.
These proofs can also be replaced with zero-knowledge proofs.
After the ﬁnal mixing stage, the ballots are in plaintext form. They can then
be tallied in a normal fashion. This tally is easily veriﬁed because the ballots are
public. This doesn’t violate the privacy of the voters because the votes have been
anonymized.
El Gamal encryption is commonly used for mix-nets. Let p be a large prime and
g be a generator modulus p. The private key is x ∈R Z∗p and the public key is y = gx
(mod p). The encryption function is Ey[m] = (a, b) = (g
r (mod p), myr (mod p)),
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r ∈R Z∗p and the decryption function is Dx[c] = a−xb (mod p). To generate PK
from PKi for 0 ≤ i < a, simply take the product of all the public keys. That is,
PK =
∏
0≤i<a PKi. To partially decrypt ciphertext c = (a, b) with SKi = x, let
c′ = (a, a−xb).
3.3 Cryptographic Approaches to Voter Veriﬁca-
tion
This section describes the existing proposals for cryptographic voter veriﬁcation.
These schemes take existing mix-net protocols and add voter veriﬁcation to produce
schemes with end-to-end veriﬁcation. The work of David Chaum and Andrew Neﬀ
are discussed in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
As discussed above, mix-net voting schemes all achieve some assurance that votes
are not tampered with once they are encrypted. The last step is to achieve veriﬁcation
that the encrypted ballot contains the voter’s intended choices without reverting to
relying on paper for a ﬁnal vote count and while maintaining secrecy and anonymity.
This is extremely diﬃcult because voters cannot be given a traditional receipt, which
would violate secrecy, but must be provided with some physical assurance of their
votes being counted. Two schemes that handle this issue have been proposed. David
Chaum proposed a scheme that uses visual cryptography to provide an encrypted
receipt of the ballot [7] while Andrew Neﬀ’s idea uses a codebook of encrypted re-
sponses for each voter[20]. They have each outlined a process by which an entire
election can be run, but this section will focus on how the receipts are generated and
why they provide voter veriﬁcation.
3.3.1 Chaum and Visual Cryptography
In Chaum’s proposed scheme [7], the user enters her vote into the DRE machine as
usual. After the ballot is ﬁlled out, but before it is submitted, a two layer transparency
is printed. The layers are stuck together and the printing is done on the outer surfaces
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of the layers. Each pixel is represented by the two corresponding pattern squares on
these transparencies such that if the patterns are the same, light can shine through,
and if not, the square is opaque. The result is a visual method of “xoring” the two
layers. The layers are produced from the ballot image determined by the voter through
the ballot selection process, a pseudorandom number generation process based on the
serial number of the ballot and the public keys of the trustees who will be responsible
for decrypting the ballots. When the two layers lay on top of each other, the original
ballot image is visible. If they are separated, both layers are encrypted.
At this point, the encrypted receipts have not been cutoﬀ from the printer and
the machine will be waiting for a conﬁrmation that the ballot is correct. If the voter
approves the ballot, she will then be asked to randomly choose a layer, top or bottom.
A ﬁnal signature will be printed on the layer chosen and the voter will remove the
resulting ballot. To complete the process, the voter must shred the layer she did not
choose. She should retain the chosen layer, which can later be used to verify after
the election is completed that her encrypted ballot was among those counted.
Immediately after leaving the voting booth, the voter can verify that her ballot
was encrypted properly by checking the signature on the layer and that the pseu-
dorandomness revealed by that layer was generated properly. These computational
tasks can be done through public algorithms. The voter can implement her own
version of the veriﬁcation software or rely on a trusted third party to provide the
software that performs the veriﬁcation.
At the end of the election, all of the layers retained by the voters are also published
on a designated public website. These are the oﬃcial encrypted ballots. A voter can
check her receipt against what is posted and provide physical evidence of her vote if
it does not appear or if it is diﬀerent than posted.
If either of these veriﬁcation steps fail, the voter can bring her ballot to the election
authorities to prove that it was not properly formed.
A mix-net is then used to decrypt the ballots while dissociating the encryptions
with the ﬁnal plaintext. Multiple parties with diﬀering interests can be included in
this process to ensure the correctness and secrecy of this process.
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Security of Chaum’s scheme
There are three sources of fraud that Chaum’s scheme protects against: the machine,
the voter, and the trustee. Protection against machine fraud is achieved by forcing
the machine to print the layers before it knows which layer the voter will choose. If
the machine attempts to cheat by encrypting a diﬀerent ballot image while making
the transparencies combine to form the correct image, it will have to alter some
of the pseudorandomness from what it would correctly use. If the user is equally
likely to pick either layer, the machine has a 50% chance of choosing to cheat on
the wrong layer. If even a small percentage of the receipts produced are checked
for correctly formed randomness, there will still be an overwhelming likelihood that
widespread fraud will be caught. Unlike any plaintext receipts, the encrypted ballot
gives no information about the original ballot receipt. This prevents voters from
selling their votes by proving who they voted for. Against trustees, anonymity and
secrecy is achieved by using a mix-net to allow a series of servers to each remove
one layer of encryption on each ballot and permute the results. Forcing each server
to demonstrate half of the correspondences protects against cheating, and the use
of mutually adversarial parties as trustees ensures anonymity as long as one honest
trustee exists.
The obvious problems with this scheme are ensuring the destruction of the trans-
parency not chosen, printing the receipts, and voter confusion. If any copy of the
other transparency is retained, secrecy is destroyed. This will require vigilance at
polls and careful consideration of how the information is stored on the machines. The
printing is a huge problem, one that has come up with voter veriﬁed paper trails
and is made more complex here with two-layer double-sided transparencies. Finally,
voters will most likely ﬁnd choosing between the two layers confusing because it will
not be obvious to the average member of the public what purpose this serves. These
are a few of the challenges of the scheme, some of which are unavoidable.
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3.3.2 Neﬀ and Votehere.net
In one of Neﬀ’s schemes, which is marketed commercially by votehere.net [20, 19],
a voter receives a random ballot number from poll workers. After providing this
number to the voting machine, a preloaded “codebook” is printed out and detached.
This speciﬁes each candidate or response for each question and a corresponding code.
The voter then ﬁlls out her ballot as usual. Before the ballot is conﬁrmed, the codes
for the selected choices are printed out on a receipt. The voter can check the codes
on her receipt against the codebook printed earlier to ensure her vote was recorded
accurately. If the voter is satisﬁed, she accepts the ballot and takes the receipt and
a printed signature. If not, she must request another ballot number and start over.
Before leaving any polls, the voter must surrender and destroy the codebooks she
received.
For this scheme, observers take an active role. Spot checks of the machines are
produced throughout the voting process by having an observer enter a voting booth
with an unused ballot number, print the codebook, and cancel the ballot. This code-
book is checked against an independently stored record of the precomputed codebook
values. If it diﬀers, the machine is either malfunctioning or cheating.
At the end of the election, each ballot id is associated with the encryptions of
the selections encoded on the ballot receipt. These ciphertexts are posted in a public
location as the inputs to the mix-net which will anonymously decrypt the ballots. In
addition to decrypting the ballots and tabulating the results, the trustees post the
veriﬁcation codes of the ballot choices, which are based on the encryptions. The voter
can check that her ballot is listed and the codes listed on her receipt are those posted.
Observers protect against malicious voting machines. If a machine wishes to
cheat, it must print an incorrect codebook to convince the voter that her choices are
recorded properly. However, if there is a signiﬁcant chance that an observer will be
the receiver of the false codebook, the machine is unlikely to get away with widespread
fraud. Giving the voter a receipt with encrypted choices prevents her from revealing
her vote conclusively to a third party, unless they can steal the codebook, as only the
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voter saw the correspondence.
The remaining possibility of cheating lies with the trustees, which is prevented by
choosing mutually adversarial parties and using mix-nets and threshold encryption
for determining the veriﬁcation codes.
The obvious problem with this scheme is managing the codebooks. Voters must
not keep their codebooks. Additionally, the observers must be carefully administered
to prevent them from casting extra votes or violating anonymity using their access
to the codebooks. Trustees must not have access to the ﬁnal codebooks, just their
portions of them, otherwise they can directly associate the code with choices and
violate anonymity. This process seems more physically feasible than the Chaum
scheme, but places more trust in election oﬃcials.
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Chapter 4
A Homomorphic Voter-Veriﬁable
Election Scheme
The challenge in making an election scheme voter-veriﬁable lies in the fact that a
voter, being human, has limited computational abilities. The most one can ask of
a voter inside a voting booth is to compare two things and determine if they are
diﬀerent. All other computation must be deferred to a later point. This makes “cut
and choose” a natural choice for a protocol with human veriﬁcation.
Cut and choose was formalized by Brassard, Chaum, and Crepeau [4], though
the idea ﬁrst appears in the protocol described by M. Rabin [26]. The analogy used
was the problem of sharing a cake between two mutually distrustful parties. Each
party wants as large a slice as possible. To ensure that the slices are as equitable as
possible, one party slices and the other chooses which slice to take. If the ﬁrst party
slices the cake unevenly, she will receive the smaller slice. Therefore, she is motivated
to divide the cake fairly.
In this case, the voter and the voting booth can be thought of as the mutually
distrustful parties. Since the voting booth is the one with the computational power,
it does the slicing and the voter chooses a slice.
The scheme proposed in this thesis adds a layer of voter veriﬁcation on top of
existing homomorphic encryption techniques. Section 4.1 presents the scheme and
describes the voter experience. Section 4.2 describes the mathematical details of the
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veriﬁcation process, and section 4.3 proves the security of the scheme. Section 4.4
describes the implementation of the scheme and demonstrates how a typical election
using the scheme might work.
4.1 Overview of the scheme
The scheme extends the voting protocol described in section 3.1.4. First, several pos-
sible ballots are prepared for a particular race. The order of candidates is randomly
permuted on each ballot. After committing to a set of ballots, the voting machine
presents them to the voter, who must select one ballot with which to cast her vote.
The voting machine then provides proofs that the unchosen ballots match their com-
mitments, which can be veriﬁed by the voter. This prevents the voting machine from
falsifying any particular ballot without risking that the falsiﬁed ballot is not chosen,
in which case the machine would not be able to prove the commitment.
This voter-veriﬁcation protocol breaks down into three phases: inside the voting
booth and receipt veriﬁcation.
These are the steps inside the voting booth:
1. Voting Machine: Generate d ballots and print a commitment for each ballot
to the receipt. Display a grid of the candidates committed to on the screen.
2. Voter: Choose a candidate from those printed on the screen.
3. Voting Machine: Print the row and column of the voter’s selection, the the
contents of the unchosen ballots and proofs that those commitments were cor-
rectly formed.
4. Voter: Verify that the ballot selected is the one identiﬁed on the receipt and
that the commitment proofs correspond to what is displayed on the screen.
5. Voter: If satisﬁed that the voting machine behaved properly, approve the bal-
lot. Otherwise, cancel the ballot and start again or contact an election oﬃcial.
6. Voter: Remove the ﬁnal receipt.
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After leaving the voting booth, the voter can verify her receipt was correctly
formed.
1. For each candidate in each unchosen ballot, check that the candidate revealed
and the proof provided verify the commitment.
2. Verify that the receipt is among those posted to the oﬃcial website and the
posted receipt and paper receipt are identical.
Figure 4-1 shows the steps the voter must take and the inputs to each step. If the
voter is asked to choose one of k candidates for a race, she is presented with a d by
k grid on the screen as in Grid A of Figure 4-1, where d is an small integer security
constant, such as 2 or 3. Each of the d rows contains a random permutation of the k
candidates. When the grid is presented, a cryptographic commitment to the grid is
printed. Receipt Part A in Figure 4-1 is this commitment. At this point, the voter
must select the candidate she wishes to vote for and a row to vote in.
Let r ∈ {0, · · · , k − 1} and c ∈ {0, · · · , d − 1} be the voter’s row and column
choice. In Figure 4-1, this corresponds to a vote for the triangle candidate. This
information is printed on the receipt tape, along with the grid displayed to the voter
for rows 0 through r − 1 and r + 1 through d− 1 and reveal information that proves
the commitments were properly formed. Grid B and Receipt Part B pictured in 4-1
show this stage of the process.
The voter must then either conﬁrm her vote or start with a new ballot. Before
conﬁrming, she should check that the row and column printed on the receipt matches
the box chosen on the screen, and that the candidate information printed on the
receipt for all rows except r matches the information on the screen. In Figure 4-1,
this corresponds to matching the highlighted box in Grid B to the cell speciﬁed at the
top of Receipt Part B and matching the rest of Grid B to the grid printed on Receipt
Part B. If there are any discrepancies, the voter should discard the ballot and either
start a new ballot or alert the poll oﬃcials. After she approves the ballot, the voting
machine prints a digital signature to the receipt, and the voter removes it and leaves.
The signature corresponds to Receipt Part C in 4-1.
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Start ballot
------------------------------------------------
Commitments:
E[0,0] E[0,1] ...E[0,k-1]
:
:
E[d-1,0]E[d-1,1]...E[d-1,k-1]
------------------------------------------------
Vote chosen: 
[row r, column c]
------------------------------------------------
(   ,R[0,0])...(   ,R[0,c])...(   ,R[0,k-1])
:
(   ,R[r-1,0])...(   ,R[r-1,c])...(   ,R[r-1,k-1])
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
(  ,R[r+1,0])...(  ,R[r+1,c])...(  ,R[r+1,k-1])
:
(   ,R[d-1,0])...(  ,R[d-1,c])...(  ,R[d-1,k-1])
-----------------------------------------------------
[Signature of booth on this ballot]
End ballot
--------------------------------------------
0 k-1
0
d-1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1
d-2
1 k-2
0 k-1c
0
d-1
r
..
...
... ..
...
...
...
...
... ...
...
...
Step 1: voter selects 
r,c to be her vote
Step 2: voter verifies
her vote and confirms
E[i,j] represents the commitment
for cell in the ith row, jth column.
R[i,j] represents the randomness
used to form E[i,j]
Grid A:
Grid B:
Receipt
Part A:
Receipt
Part B:
Receipt
Part C:
Figure 4-1: An overview of the proposed voter-veriﬁcation scheme. The left hand
side shows the grids that will be displayed on the screen, while the right hand side
shows the receipt that will be printed. Note that there are three contiguous parts to
the receipt which are divided to show the points at which the voter interacts with the
voting machine.
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After the election is concluded, all the ballot receipts are posted electronically
for the public to review. A voter should check that the receipt she received in the
voting booth was posted correctly. A voter should also verify that her ballot is
correctly formed – i.e., that the reveal information matches the commitments. As in
Chaum’s scheme, trusted third parties such as the ACLU could provide software for
this veriﬁcation, or the voter could implement her own.
Because the votes for each race are encrypted homomorphically with Paillier’s
scheme, the encrypted tally is formed by multiplying all the votes for a particular
race. The encrypted tally can be veriﬁed by anyone, using the publicly posted ballots.
It can also be decrypted in a veriﬁable manner.
4.2 Mathematical details
A standard k-candidate election for v voters is set up using Paillier encryption. Let
n = pq and g ∈ Z∗n2 with order αn for some nonzero α.
After the grid is generated, each cell contains the name of one of the candi-
dates. For the cell in the xth column and yth row containing candidate i, let
cx,y = g
miρnx,y mod n
2 , where mi ∈ M, ρx,y ∈R Z∗n, be the commitment generated
using Paillier encryption. The commitments for all cells are printed to the receipt.
The commitments can be condensed by hashing, reducing the length of the receipt.
Let r, c be the row and column the voter chose as her vote. After printing the
voter’s selection, the machine opens the commitments for all rows except r. That is,
ρx,y for all y and x = r is printed to the receipt along with the candidate that the
corresponding cell contained. At this point the voter removes the receipt.
If, after leaving the voting booth, the voter chooses to verify her vote, it can be
done by checking that all of the commitments in rows outside of r were properly
formed. To check that a particular cell x, y is properly formed, construct c′x,y =
gmiρx,y mod n
2 where mi is the candidate printed on the receipt for that cell. If c
′
x,y
is equal to the cx,y found on the receipt, the commitment was properly formed.
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4.3 Security of the scheme
It can now be proven that the voting machine has a uniformly small chance of de-
frauding the voter. If the machine prints commitments to votes that do not match
up to the grid on the screen, there are two possible outcomes.
If the false commitments are in the row the voter chooses, the fraud will not be
discovered. The machine will not reveal the contents of this row because that would
destroy the voter’s privacy. However, if the voter’s choice is suﬃciently random and
unbiased, the machine has only a 1/d chance of predicting the row the voter will
select.
Otherwise, the machine will have to provide reveal information for the false com-
mitment. The machine could change the screen to match the false commitment and
risk the voter noticing. For example, in a race between candidates X, Y, and Z, a
voting machine might wish to switch votes for X and Y. Looking at the grids below,
the machine could commit to Grid A (on the left) but display Grid B (on the right)
on the screen.
Z Y X Z X Y
X Z Y Y Z X
Z X Y Z Y X
Suppose the voter selects Z for the ﬁrst row, ﬁrst column of Grid B, which is
displayed on the screen. The voting machine can print Grid C, below, to the receipt,
and change the screen to display Grid A instead of Grid B.
- - -
X Z Y
Z X Y
If the voter does not notice the reversal of X and Y in the second and third rows of
the grid on the receipt, the machine has successfully cheated. The feasibility of such
a reversal is discussed later, as it is more an issue of usability and human interface.
The second way for the machine to cheat is to provide the correct reveal informa-
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tion for the false commitment along with the candidate choice the voter expects. For
example, say that the machine has committed to candidate Y for row i and column
j, but displays candidate Z in that cell on the screen. Let ci,j be the commitment
for the cell, which is an encryption of mY with some randomness rY ∈ Zn. If the
voter chooses a row other than i for her ballot, the machine prints mZ , rY for the
reveal information even though this will not verify ci,j as described in section 4.2.
The falsiﬁcation will be detected if the voter chooses to cryptographically verify their
receipt at a later time, but will not be noticed in the voting booth. The feasibility
of this attack is dependent on the likelihood that the voter checks their ballot after
leaving the voting booth.
The ﬁnal possibility for the cheating voting machine is to generate a proof for the
candidate choice displayed on the screen that corresponds to the false commitment
printed to the receipt. More explicitly, given commitment c = E[mi, ρi] to candidate
i, ﬁnd ρj such that c = E[mj , ρj]. Earlier it was shown that the Paillier encryption
scheme is one-way based on CCRA. Therefore, it is not computationally feasible for
the cheating voting machine to provide a ρi for the false commitment.
Therefore, the voting machine has a 1/d chance of undetectably cheating for each
vote. The question of whether this is suﬃcient depends on many factors, not the
least of which is d. If it is assumed that the voting machine needs to alter .5% of the
votes to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the outcome of an election (this estimate may be too low,
considering the winner’s margin during the 2000 presidential election was less than
.5% in four states [24]), the machine would need to change 10 votes to change the
outcome of a 2,000 person election. If d = 2, the machine would have a 1 in 1,024
chance to succeed at altering .5% of the 2,000 votes.
To add more privacy and security, most of the techniques discussed in section
3.1.4 can be added onto the scheme with no modiﬁcation. It is important to use zero-
knowledge proofs to verify the correctness of the ballots, and threshold encryption to
maintain the privacy of voters even from election oﬃcials.
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4.3.1 Human factors and their eﬀect on security
The chance that cheating is detected is actually much lower than described above due
to human factors. According to the U.S. Census, only about 60% of eligible citizens
registered and voted in the 2000 presidential election [1]. This apathy carries over
to election day tasks, but the scheme requires that the voter perform several tasks
in addition to actually selecting their candidate. A recent study [27] by Ted Selker
found that less than 10% of voters noticed errors on the receipt in a simulated election
with a voter veriﬁed paper audit trail.
Assume that only 1 out of every t voters actually follows through on all of the
veriﬁcation procedures. Without taking voter apathy into account, there was a (d −
1)/d chance that a machine’s fraud would be detected by each voter that was cheated.
This has been reduced to (d − 1)/(d ∗ t). For his voter-veriﬁable scheme, Chaum
assumes a t of 20 [7]. If this value is assumed in the case presented above where the
machine altered 10 votes, and d = 2, there is around a 75% chance of successful fraud.
However, successful cheating would involve far more votes in most elections. Altering
just 200 votes reduces the chances of remaining undetected to .5%. Given that the
2000 presidential election had a turnout of 111 million, the chance of undetectably
aﬀecting the election seems negligible.
4.4 Implementation
An implementation of the scheme proposed in this chapter is now described. Section
4.4.1 describes our implementation of the Paillier scheme, and section 4.4.2 discusses
the structure of the races and ballots. The tabulation process and actual voting
experience are presented in sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, respectively.
To demonstrate the scheme, a basic implementation was done in Java 1.4.2. The
implementation focused on the new aspects of the scheme and did not include some
features, such as multiple authorities and veriﬁable decryption, that would be neces-
sary for a real-world election. Also left out of this implementation were proofs that
the ﬁnal vote is actually from the set of acceptable votes. This is not necessarily
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an oversight, as the cut-and-choose protocol also provides probabilistic assurance of
ballot correctness. All the references to printers refer to printing to the command
line.
4.4.1 Paillier implementation
Despite being a common encryption scheme in cryptographic literature, there was no
easily available implementation of Paillier encryption for Java. Therefore, a Pallier
package was implemented for use in the voting system.
The Paillier keys are generated in the expected fashion by the class PaillierKeyGenerator.
Two primes of a speciﬁed size are found, n and λ(n) are calculated, and a g is found.
The interfaces PaillierKey, PaillierPrivateKey, and PaillierPublicKey follow
the conventions set up in the java.security package.
The other class in this package is PaillierAlgorithm, which implements the en-
cryption and decryption function as well as providing methods useful for PaillierKeyGenerator.
The client is given the option of providing a source of randomness for both the key
generation and the encryption options.
4.4.2 Races and ballots
It is important to make the ballot implementation ﬂexible, as a race can be a 100-
candidate race or a 500-word proposition. The instances of the Race class are gen-
erated from a RaceTemplate which stores the name of the race or question, the
candidates, and the integers that represent each candidate. Similarly, Ballots are
constructed from BallotTemplates. Each such BallotTemplate contains the name
of the election, RaceTemplates, and the public key for the election.
When a new ballot is created, in addition to the BallotTemplate, the client must
provide a unique ballot ID and d, the number of rows the grid for each race will have.
This will be used to generate the Races from the RaceTemplates. The only time Race
is altered is when the vote is selected by the selectVote method, which can only be
called successfully once.
51
After a race is voted on, an instance of RaceTally is formed from the commitments
and the reveal information of the unvoted rows. A separate class is used here because
accessing individual cells within the commitment and reveal grids is not allowed
during the actual voting process but is important for the tabulation and veriﬁcation
process. During the voting process, the grids can only be read in their entirety.
RaceTallys are collected into a BallotTally in preparation for tabulation.
4.4.3 Tabulation
The Tabulator class has two tasks: accumulating the ballots, and decrypting and
calculating the ﬁnal tally. To accumulate ballots, it takes in a list of BallotTally
objects and extracts out the commitments for the actual vote for each race, accu-
mulating the running products. After the accumulation is completed, the Tabulator
can either return the encrypted tally or determine the actual tallies. The getTally
method of Tabulator requires the client to provide the private key. The decryption
and tabulation happens much the way it was previously described.
4.4.4 Virtual voting booth
The “voting booth” is a window with four buttons, a question and a grid of possible
answers as in Figure 4-2. Note that the rows and columns are labeled with numbers
and letters. The buttons give the user the option of starting a new ballot at all times.
The other buttons are greyed out when not available. For this particular example,
the voter is asked “What is your favorite animal?” and presented with the following
choices: Duck, Penguin, Walrus, Tree 1. The election pictured in 4-2 has a security
factor of d = 4, i.e. there are 4 rows.
When a new ballot is started, “Start Receipt” is printed, followed by the name
of the ballot and the ballot ID number and then a dashed line. The commitments
are printed next, in hashed form. Figure 4-3 shows a voter’s receipt for the election
from Figure 4-2. Section A of the receipt in the ﬁgure shows the “Start Receipt” and
1Note that one of these things is not like the others.
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Figure 4-2: A view of the poll booth window, after a vote is selected.
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commitments, corresponding to Receipt Part A in Figure 4-1. With 1024 bit keys,
each unhashed commitment was 100 hexadecimal characters long. With hashing,
each row of commitments could be represented in around 25 characters, plus check
digits to provide error-detection when scanning the receipts.
At this point, the voter chooses to vote for the candidate in row r, column c. On
the screen, the color of the element in the grid that is selected changes to teal. In
Figure 4-2, this is row 2, column C which represents a vote for “Tree.” At the same
time, the printer records the voter’s choice and prints a grid of the candidates, match-
ing the grid still displayed on the screen, with “XXXXX” in place of the elements in
row r. In Figure 4-3 this is section B, corresponding to Receipt Part B in Figure 4-1.
The reveal information is quite large; for a 1024-bit key, each proof is 100 characters
long, and cannot be hashed since it is to be used for veriﬁcation. The election that
produced the receipt in Figure 4-3 used a 64-bit key.
After the vote is entered, the program waits for the voter to either conﬁrm the
ballot or restart. The voter should check that the grid on the screen and the grid
printed out are the same, and she should then select the Conﬁrm Race button. This
will save the entered vote and move on to the next race. In Figure 4-3, section A’
shows the commitments for the next race and section B’ shows the reveal information.
After the voter has selected and conﬁrmed a candidate for each race, she can
click Conﬁrm Ballot and “Ballot conﬁrmed” will be printed, followed by a line that
indicates the end of the receipt. This is section C in Figure 4-3, corresponding to
Receipt Part C in Figure 4-1. The machine then restarts the whole process with
a fresh ballot. Once one ballot has been conﬁrmed, the Tabulate button becomes
available. If the Tabulate button is selected, a summary of the results of the election
will be printed to the command line. Figure 4-4 shows the result of the election
described in 4-2.
54
Figure 4-3: The receipt presented to the voter after completing a two-race election.
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Figure 4-4: The receipt presented after tabulating a two race election.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The previous chapter proposed a new voting scheme which adds voter veriﬁcation to
existing homomorphic voting systems, and presented an initial partial implementation
of the scheme. The scheme achieves cryptographic voter veriﬁcation, despite human
limitations, for homomorphic voting systems. The proposal could be further adapted
to take advantage of other extensions of the traditional homomorphic voting scheme.
The implementation provides an opportunity to evaluate the feasibility and usability
of the proposal.
The implementation served to uncover the drawbacks of adding voter veriﬁcation
to a homomorphic election system. The biggest problem is the tradeoﬀ between
usability and security. Voters will be confused if they are presented with multiple
ways of doing the same task, and the randomness of a candidate’s location in the grid
does not lessen this confusion. Adding more rows to the grid reduces the possibility
that the voting machine will cheat undetectably, but reduces the user-friendliness of
the ballot. It also makes the receipt longer and more diﬃcult to verify.
Another issue arises because all proposed cryptographic systems that provide voter
veriﬁcation are designed so that the receipts can be used to prove whether a voting
machine cheats, yet the receipts themselves are diﬃcult to authenticate. In the pro-
posed scheme, the last step is for the voting machine to sign the receipt. But inside
the voting booth, the voter has no way of knowing if the signature is properly formed.
The voter must wait until she exits the booth to verify the correctness of the signa-
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ture. If she determines that the signature is not valid, she can approach an election
oﬃcial to complain. However, this creates a new problem for the election oﬃcial: how
is it possible to determine whether an improperly formed receipt was created by a
voting machine? Possible solutions include using special paper or watermarks, which
would raise the costs of the system, or retiring machines that receive complaints for
the remainder of the election.
A third issue that needs to be addressed in this scheme is where the randomness
comes from. All of the cryptography requires a random seed. In practice, a random
seed is chosen, and then a pseudorandom generator produces the randomness used
for permutations and encryptions. If the voting machine uses a seed provided by an
outside party, the outside party could potentially break some of the privacy of the
voters that use that machine. Asking the voter to provide the randomness would
allow the voter to sell their vote.
The same issues can be found in the schemes proposed by Chaum and Neﬀ, in-
cluding the tradeoﬀ between usability and security. This issue can be addressed. For
suﬃciently large elections, using only two rows should be suﬃcient. Improving the
overall user-friendliness of the design can also alleviate the problem. Hashing the
commitments instead of printing them in their entirety helps reduce the length of the
receipts. While the reveal information cannot be hashed, it could be printed as a
barcode since it can only be veriﬁed by computers.
The scheme presented here achieves the goal of a secure and private homomorphic
voter-veriﬁed election scheme. While it has ﬂaws, they are the same problems that
appear in all voter-veriﬁed systems.
5.1 Future work
There are several potential areas for improvement in the design and the implementa-
tion of this scheme. One major issue is the graphical user interface. Currently, it is
very basic. A voting machine should allow voters to skip races or return to previous
questions and alter a selection; the implementation does not currently do so. Finally,
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instead of printing to paper, the implementation presented in this thesis prints to
the command line. This is not an accurate simulation, as it allows words to wrap in
the terminal window and thereby hides the true size of the receipt. Improving the
interface would allow us to determine whether this system is truly feasible.
Another issue is the problem of matching the printed grid with the grid on the
screen. If a machine was malicious, it could display a grid diﬀerent from the one
it commits to cryptographically on the receipt. After the voter selects her cell in
the grid, the machine could alter the grid on the screen to display the values that
correspond to the printed commitments. If the voter does not pay careful attention
to the grid on the screen, she might miss this deception. Even if she does notice, her
only option is to start over with a new ballot.
A potential solution to this problem would be to color-code the grid, so that a
change would be more noticeable. If each candidate assigned a color, altering the
arrangement of candidates would alter the pattern of colors in the grid. Such changes
are more noticeable to the human eye. Additionally, each voting machine could be
assigned a ﬁxed color pattern and the colors randomly assigned to candidates for each
voter. A reference color pattern could be kept in the voting booth and would prevent
the machine from altering the pattern.
One major deﬁciency of the proposed voting system is its inability to handle write-
in votes. Mixnet’s ability to handle such elections is a clear advantage. Kiayias and
Yung designed a system that supplemented homomorphic encryption of the ballots
with a mixnet for write-in votes [16]. Applying voter veriﬁcation to that scheme
would be tremendously useful.
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